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CONTROLLING STATUTES AND RULES 
The controlling provisions of the Mechanic's Lien Act relating to the 
contractual issues of the parties are: 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-2 (2002), "Contractors" and "subcontractors" 
defined. 
Any person who does work or furnishes materials by contract, 
express or implied, with the owner, as provided in this chapter, shall 
be considered an original contractor, and all other persons doing work 
or furnishing materials shall be considered subcontractors. (Emphasis 
added) 
2. Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (1994) Those entitled to lien - What may be 
attached. 
Contractors, subcontractors, and all persons performing any services 
or furnishing or renting any materials or equipment used in the 
construction, alteration,... ~ whether at the instance of the owner or 
of any other person acting bv his authority as agent, contractor, ~ 
... This lien shall attach only to such interest as the owner may have in 
the property. (Emphasis added) 
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The following rules are also applicable to this appeal: 
3. Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Briefs 
. . A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all the 
record evidence that supports the challenged finding. 
4. Rule 52, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure (2006), FINDINGS BY THE COURT. 
(a) Effect. In all actions tried upon the facts without a jury or with an 
advisory jury, the court shall find the facts specially and state 
separately its conclusions of law thereon. . . 
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PARTIES 
The names of the original parties to this action are contained in the caption 
of this brief. However, only Debbie A. Burke remains a Defendant in this instant 
action. 
• "Defendant," hereinafter refers to Debbie A. Burke, the sole owner named on 
the fee simple title of the real property at issue. 
• "Plaintiff/5 hereinafter refers to Mark D. Bergman, the carpenter/handyman 
hired by the Defendant and Vince Isbell (hereinafter "Defendant's Agent") to 
complete various projects to the interior and exterior of the Defendant's real 
property. 
Others of Significant Interest 
• "Defendant's Agent," (as defined above) is the Defendant's husband, a 
General Contractor licensed with the State of Utah and the individual 
authorized by the Defendant to supervise the repair and renovation work on the 
property at issue. 
• "Listing Agent," hereinafter refers to Laura L. Strebel the Plaintiffs wife and 
the Defendant's duly authorized Real Estate Agent engaged by the Defendant to 
market the Defendant's real property for sale. 
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Statement of Jurisdiction 
This appeal is within the general jurisdiction of Utah Code Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j) and does not involve any matter or issue within the exclusive 
jurisdiction of the Utah Supreme Court. After opinion the Utah Supreme Court, 
ordered this appeal transferred to this Utah Appellate Court by order dated May 
2, 2008. 
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Issues Presented for Review and Standard for Review 
1. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion when it concluded: 
a. "The Court concludes that there was no meeting of the minds on the 
essential elements of any agreement between the parties.55 
b. "The parties did not form an oral contract for the work for Ms. Burke's 
home.55 
Standard for review Whether a contract implied in fact exists is generally 
considered a question of fact, and we review a trial court's factual findings under 
the deferential clearly erroneous standard. See Ryan v. Danfs Food Stores, Inc., 972 
P.2d 395, 401 (Utah 1998); Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 
1141, 1144 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). However, we mretain["] the power to decide 
whether, as a matter of law, a reasonable [fact finder] could find that an implied 
contract exists."1 Ryan, 972 P.2d at 401 (quoting Sanderson v. First Sec. Leasing 
Co., 844 P.2d 303, 306 (Utah 1992)). "As our review of this matter is limited to 
the trial courtfs factual findings, which we accept as valid, we will be determining 
whether an implied-in-fact contract exists as a matter of law in light of those 
findings." (quoting Uhrhahn Construction v. Lamar Hopkins 2008 UT App 41; 179 
P.3d 808.) 
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2. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion when it allowed the Defendant to offer 
as proof of payment to the Plaintiff, alleged cash payments totaling $2,700.00 
without corroborating evidence that suggested such payments were actually 
made? 
Standard for review Evidence of payments is a factual determinations that are 
reviewed for correctness. Marks v. Marks, 1940 UT, 100 P.2d 207 "Accordingly, 
we hold that an obligee bears the burden of proving that he or she has fulfilled his 
or her obligations" 
3. Did the Trial Court abuse its discretion when it did not state nor explain the 
evidentiary foundation to support its factual findings? The findings stated by 
the Trial Court clearly do not support the Trial Court's conclusion of law, but 
rather are in conflict with each other, unclear and are argumentative in nature. 
Standard for review "we review a trial court's factual findings under the 
deferential clearly erroneous standard." See Ryan v. Dan's Food Stores, Inc., 972 
P.2d 395, 401 (Utah 1998); Sorenson v. Kennecott-Utah Copper Corp., 873 P.2d 
1141, 1144 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). (quoting Uhrhahn Construction v. Lamar 
Hopkins 2008 UT App 41; 179 P.3d 808.) 
4. Was the Trial Court's award of damages proper given the lack of explicit 
factual findings regarding such award? 
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Standard for review "[An] award of damages is a factual determination that we 
review for clear error." Saleh v. Farmers Ins. Exch., 2006 UT 20, P 29, 133 P.3d 
428. (quoting Uhrhahn Construction v. Lamar Hopkins 2008 UT App 41; 179 
P.3d 808) 
5. Did the Trial Court disregard the evidence that the Defendant's Agent had 
authorization to approve or disapprove / increase or decrease the scope of repair 
and renovation work that the Plaintiff was performing on the Defendant's 
property? As the party charged by the Defendant with authorizing work on the 
real property at issue, the Defendant is liable to the Plaintiff for work preformed 
on such property at the Defendant's Agent's request. 
Standard for review Damages that the Defendant owed the Plaintiff are a factual 
determination that is reviewed for correctness, (quoting Uhrhahn Construction v. 
Lamar Hopkins 2008 UT App 41; 179 P.3d 808.) "Interpretation of the terms of a 
contract is a question of law. Thus, we accord the trial court's conclusions 
regarding the contract no deference and review them for correctness." Nova Cas. 
Co. v. Able Constr., 1999 UT 69, P6, 983 P.2d 575, (quoting Advanced 
Restoration v. Priskos, et al„ 2005 UT App 505, 539 Ut. Adv. Rep. 66) 
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Statement of the Case 
This case came for trial on the Plaintiffs single cause of action on the 
foreclosure of a mechanic's lien recorded upon the Defendant's real property, 
pursuant to which the Plaintiff claimed to have a legal interest in the Defendant's 
real property and the home thereon. Such mechanic's lien secured the debt of 
$28,675 due to the Plaintiff by the Defendant, in consideration of the work 
performed by the Plaintiff and expenses incurred in connection therewith pursuant 
to a verbal agreement between the parties. 
On or about August 12, 2004, the Defendant filed an Answer to the 
Plaintiffs Complaint, and included a Counterclaim against the Plaintiff. In such 
Answer and Counterclaim, the Defendant alleged that the Plaintiffs Complaint 
was founded upon a wrongful lien pursuant to Utah Code Annotated 38-9-1 Et 
Seq., and prayed the Trial Court order the mechanic's lien be found to be a 
wrongful lien and requested that the Defendant be awarded treble damages and 
attorney fees. 
On or about August 4, 2005, the Defendant moved for Summary Judgment 
claiming that the mechanic's lien contained material misstatements and the 
Plaintiffs mailing of the lien documents to the Defendant did not disclose the 
homeowner's rights found under Utah Code Ann. § 38-l-7(2)(h) of the Utah 
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mechanic's lien statutes. Furthermore, the Defendant prayed the Trial Court order 
the mechanic's lien be found defective and invalid and the Defendant awarded cost 
and attorney fees. On or about December 15, 2005, the Trial Court heard oral 
arguments, and on February 24, 2006, entered the order denying the Defendant's 
motion on the record. 
On or about November 13 and 14, 2007, the case came to trial before the 
Honorable Parley R. Baldwin. After a two-day bench trial, Judge Baldwin 
requested the parties submit closing arguments in writing, due to lack of available 
time of the Court. On or about January 16, 2008, the Trial Court entered its final 
Judgment and Order into the record. 
Such Judgment and Order found in favor of the Plaintiff and awarded the 
amount of $7,500. The Trial Court found that the amount of $5,220 previously 
paid by the Defendant to the Plaintiff shall be deducted from the awarded $7,500, 
leaving a balance of $2,280 due by the Defendant to the Plaintiff. 
The Trial Court awarded the Plaintiff $2,280 and concluded that there was 
not a meeting of the minds between the parties, that the parties did not have an oral 
contract and based upon the supervision of the Defendant's Agent's Utah State 
Contractor's license, the Plaintiff was not required to be so licensed. The Trial 
Court also found that each party shall bear their own attorney's fees and cost. 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Rule 52(a), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, requires that" '[i]n all actions 
tried upon the facts without a jury or with an advisory jury, the court shall find the 
facts specially and state separately its conclusions of law thereon5 " (quoting Utah 
R. Civ. P. 52(a)). 
As the case at hand was tried upon the facts and without a jury, the Plaintiff 
is arguing the case on appeal upon its merits and challenging the Trial Court's 
factual findings and conclusions of law as framed. The Trial Court's conclusions 
do not appear to be supported by the evidence and such are legally insufficient, are 
ambiguous, and do not appear to be based upon law. Furthermore, the Plaintiff 
believes that the findings and conclusions are contradictory and contain 
argumentative positions relating to the actions and behavior of the parties. 
It is the Plaintiffs position that neither the Plaintiff nor a reasonable fact 
finder could justify or support the Trial Court's findings and conclusions as 
framed, and therefore fit within the exception to the marshalling requirements 
detailed within; 
Rule 24(a)(9), Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, Briefs 
. . . A party challenging a fact finding must first marshal all the 
record evidence that supports the challenged finding. 
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"The only rare exception to the marshaling requirements is if the appellant 
can show that the trial court's findings as framed are legally insufficient, i.e., the 
i 
findings do not provide enough detail to demonstrate the evidentiary basis for the 
decision thereby allowing for meaningful review," (quoting, Campbell v. 
Campbell 896 P.2d 635, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)) (citation omitted). 
In the case at hand the Trial Court's findings and conclusions are simple 
cursory statements, which speak more about the parties rather than what is the law 
and how it governs the actions of the parties. As the Trial Court does not refer to 
what evidence, facts or law that the Trial Court reviewed to base its decision, the 
findings and conclusions are insufficient to allow for a meaningful review. 
Therefore, marshaling the evidence in this case would at best be founded on 
speculation. 
ADEQUACY OF THE FINDINGS 
"To successfully challenge the findings, the appellant must ordinarily 
demonstrate they are clearly erroneous. To make such a showing, appellant is 
required to marshal all the evidence supporting the findings and then demonstrate 
that the findings are not supported by legally sufficient evidence" (quoting 
Campbell v. Campbell 896 P.2d 635, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 1995)). Also, see the 
statement in, Williamson v. Williamson 1999 UT APP 219, 983 P.2d 1103 We 
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agree with Ms. Williamson that she "need not engage in a futile marshalling 
exercise [because she] can demonstrate the findings, as framed by the court, are 
legally insufficient" Campbell v. Campbell 896 P.2d 635, 638 (Utah Ct. App. 
1995). 
Due to the lack of detail or references to law or evidence within the Trial 
Court's findings and conclusions, the Trial Court has left the Plaintiff with no-way 
to marshal the evidence to support the Trial Court's decision and such prevents a 
meaningful review. 
Nonetheless, the legally insufficiencies of findings in this case, show why 
the conclusions of law are contrary to the facts and cannot be relied upon. Detailed 
below are the findings that contain contradictory statements as per the evidence 
and facts they reveal; 
The Court states in paragraph: 
#2, "After a review of all the evidence, the Court finds that there 
was no meeting of the minds between the parties." 
#3, "The parties did not have a written contract." 
#5, "Mr. Isbell is a licensed contractor and was at Ms. Burke's 
home almost on a weekly basis to review the work performed by 
the Plaintiff." 
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#6, "Mr. Isbell provided the adequate supervision over the 
Plaintiff for the work performed by the Plaintiff." 
#8, "The Court finds that the total value of the labor and 
materials provided to Ms. Burke, for which she is liable was 
$7,500.00." 
#9, "Ms. Burke paid the Plaintiff almost on a weekly basis for the 
work and materials he provided to Ms. Burke's home." 
After the Trial Court concluded there was no contract between the parties 
and no meetings of the minds, the Trial Court must have abused its discretion when 
it found in favor of the Plaintiff and awarded the Plaintiff a total of $7,500. One 
position contradicts the other. 
In connection with the above, the Plaintiff claims the conclusions to be 
captious, ambiguous, and contradictory in facts. If the Trial Court found no 
contract and no meetings of the minds, then it cannot find the Defendant liable for 
anything, as there is no enforceable agreement. 
Yet, the Plaintiff contends that there was an enforceable agreement between 
the parties, which the Trial Court must have found, because the Trial Court 
concluded that the Defendant was liable for a portion of the debt claimed by the 
Plaintiff. 
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The Plaintiffs main argument with the Trial Court's conclusions, and that 
the Trial Court must have found evidence and facts that an agreement existed 
between the parties, only chose not to enforce it. 
Nevertheless, if the findings are true, 
then how could the Trial Court also find that, 
the Defendant still owed the Plaintiff? 
Granting the Trial Court its discretion and considering that the findings are 
true, the award granted the Plaintiff by the Trial Court is wrong and should be 
returned to the Defendant. Because, if the Trial Court could not find an agreement 
or a meeting of the minds between the parties, then neither of the parties were 
obligated to other and the alleged agreement is not enforceable. Better known as 
an illusory promise. 
Nonetheless, the Trial Court does not explain why or how it found that the 
Defendant still owed the Plaintiff, hence such facts do not allow for a meaningful 
review. The Trial Court's conclusions are legally insufficient and cannot be relied 
upon. Therefore, one can only speculate as to what the Trial Court found to issue 
its decision. 
Based on the foregoing facts and because the presiding Judge, the Honorable 
Parley R. Baldwin has announced that he will retire from the bench on December 
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31, 2008, the Plaintiff respectfully requests the judgment be vacated and remand 
for an evidentiary hearing before a new Judge, would be appropriate. At such 
time, the parties can point to all evidence presented at trial that may go to the 
findings and conclusions issue. This would further judicial efficiency because 
otherwise, a new judge would have the onerous task of pouring through the entire 
transcript, as well as all trial exhibits. 
Presented below are the entire conclusions of the Trial Court. It is the 
Plaintiffs position that the contradictory conclusions are self-evident, and in fact 
contrary to law. Therefore, it is the Plaintiffs position that the Appellate Court has 
little choice but to vacate the judgment and remand the case for a new evidentiary 
hearing. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Trial Court concluded in paragraph: 
#14. The court concludes that there was no meeting of the minds on the 
essential elements of any agreement between the parties. 
#15. The parties did not form an oral contract for the work for Ms. Burke's 
home. 
If paragraph #14 is true, combined with the statement in paragraph #15, then the 
Trial Court committed a clear error in awarding anything to the Plaintiff (SEE: 
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FISHER v. CRESTAR BANK, N. A. 2002 UT App 144,). "If a contract is 
ambiguous, courts may look to extrinsic evidence to clarify the parties1 intent." 
The trial court, after hearing the testimony, found that "even if Sine unreasonably 
believed that the March 24 letter was an independent obligation of the Bank, there 
was no meeting of the minds between Sine and the Bank," as to the meaning of 
the letter, and therefore concluded that "as such, it is unenforceable." (Emphasis 
added). 
The Trial Court's conclusions at this point are clear and leave no room for any 
further interpretation, and based upon other Utah Case Law the Plaintiffs case 
should have been dismissed right here. Nonetheless, the Trial Court felt compelled 
to go on, but by doing such the Trial Court created a legal quagmire that weigh 
heavy upon parties seeking justice. Another Utah case that reflects the Court's 
standard practice when finding that there is no meeting of the minds is as follows; 
SEE: Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37, P6 78 P.3d 600 "It is fundamental that 
a meeting of the minds on the integral features of an agreement is essential to the 
formation of a contract. An agreement cannot be enforced if its terms are 
indefinite." Richard Barton Enters, v. Tsern, 928 P.2d 368, 373 (Utah 1996) [*7] 
(citing Pingree v. Cont'l Group of Utah, Inc., 558 P.2d 1317, 1321 (Utah 1976)); 
Valcarce v. Bitters, 12 Utah 2d 61, 63, 362 P.2d 427, 428 (1961)) (additional 
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citations omitted); see also Candland v. Oldroyd, 67 Utah 605, 608, 248 P. 1101, 
1102 (1926) ("So long as there is any uncertainty or indefiniteness, or future 
negotiations or considerations to be had between the parties, there is not a 
completed contract. In fact, there is no contract at all."). 
Only, with the case at hand, the Trial Court did not say that the agreement 
seemed ambiguous, or even that the terms within the agreement were 
misunderstood or uncertain. Therefore, the Trial Court's findings and conclusions 
are insufficient and cannot to be relied upon. 
If the Trial Court reviewed all the facts and evidence concerning the long-term 
relationship of the parties and the behavior of the parties during the project at issue, 
then the weight of the evidence clearly demands for a finding that there was a 
meeting of the minds and there was an agreement to enforce. Assuming these facts 
as true, we can now look to the next conclusion of the Trial Court. 
#16. Based on Mr. IsbelPs supervision, the Plaintiff did not need to be 
licensed for the work he performed on Ms. Burke's home pursuant to the 
provisions of the Utah Code. 
The fact that the Plaintiff did not have a Utah Contractors license while in 
the employ of the Defendant, this was a question for the Trail Court to find if the 
Plaintiffs action should be dismissed, because of the facts found within Utah Code 
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Ann. § 58-55-604. Proof of licensure to maintain or commence action. 
Paragraph #16 explains that the Trial Court has concluded, NO. Therefore, 
the Trial Court found the Plaintiffs lack of proper licensing was not a factor and 
the action could move forward. 
Only that is not all the facts that this conclusion states. The Trial Court 
found the Plaintiff met the requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 58-55-604. How did 
the Trial Court find that the Plaintiff met such requirements? The Trial Court 
found that "Based on Mr. IsbelPs supervision." Who is the Mr. Isbell? Mr. 
Isbell is the Defendant's Agent and the Defendant's husband. The Trial Court 
found that the Defendant's Agent was on location supervising the work... 
This statement is exactly on point and makes the Plaintiffs entire argument. 
If the Defendant's Agent was making regular visits to the job, and supervising the 
job, then the Defendant had full knowledge of the Plaintiffs efforts and knew or 
should have known the Plaintiff expected payment for services rendered. This fact 
stands all by its self and speaks volumes about how the Trial Court's findings and 
conclusions are against the weight of the evidence and are in clear error. 
"Additionally, Landlord behaved as if Tenant was his agent in contracting with 
Advanced. It is undisputed that the Landlord knew of the repair work while it was 
being completed and did not object." (quoting Advanced Restoration v. Priskos, et 
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aL 2005 UT App 505, 539 UT. Adv. Rep. 66). 
Thus, the Trial Court's conclusion, "that there was no meeting of the 
minds" and "The parties did not form an oral contract,'9 is a clear error. The 
foregoing stated action of the Defendant's Agent places the liability for the entire 
debt upon the Defendant, as stated in: 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-3 (1994) Those entitled to lien - What 
may be attached.... ~ whether at the instance of the owner or of any 
other person acting by his authority as agent, contractor, ~ ... 
(Emphasis added) 
The Plaintiffs mechanic's lien is supported by the implied agreement 
between the parties, and the Defendant's interest was protected by on location 
supervision and oversight. Therefore, the Plaintiffs mechanic's lien is enforceable 
under the law as detailed within; 
Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-2 (2002), "Contractors" and "subcontractors" defined. 
.Any person who does work or furnishes materials by contract, 
express or implied, with the owner, as provided in this chapter, shall 
be considered an original contractor, and all other persons doing work 
or furnishing materials shall be considered subcontractors. (Emphasis 
added). 
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The simple mis-step, by the Trial Court concerning the evidence of the 
relationship and behavior of the parties caused the Trial Court's findings and 
conclusions to be legally insufficient and cannot to be relied upon. 
#17. Pursuant to the mechanic's lien the Plaintiff recorded with the Weber 
County Recorder's Office and the Complaint to foreclose that mechanic's lien 
the Plaintiff filed with the court, he is entitled to recover $2,280.00 for the 
work he provided to Ms. Burke, for which he was not compensated during the 
time the work was performed on Ms. Burke's home. 
The key fact in this conclusion is, "for which he was not compensated." 
Again, a statement that can alone, and such proves that the parties created a 
contract and the Defendant was making payments to the Plaintiff. Payments are an 
affirmation of a debt. Therefore, the findings by the Trial Court are legally 
insufficient and cannot be relied upon. 
It remains undisputed by the parties, that they had known each other for years 
(SEE: D17). Furthermore, the Trial Court was aware (by testimony) that the 
parties had previously engaged in projects together and had a working knowledge 
of the expectations placed upon the other. 
Therefore, the parties did in fact enter into an agreement with full knowledge of 
the expectations. How the Trial Court could not have considered this most crucial 
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piece of evidence is without explanation. 
Restating the same fact, the parties knew each other very well and an oral 
agreement was their regular form of practice, and the parties had repeated this 
same behavior repeatedly. Only this time, the Defendant's greed overrode the 
financial commitment to the Plaintiff. This is not the fault of the Plaintiffs. 
The Defendant was an absentee property owner and did not stay abreast of the 
condition of her property. Accordingly, it was significantly damage by previous 
tenants. At the time, the Plaintiff commenced work on the property at the 
Defendant's and Defendant's Agent request, the deplorable condition of the 
Defendant's real property remains undisputed (SEE: D17 f2). 
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Relevant Facts 
The Presiding Trial Court Judge has announced that he will take his retirement 
on or about December 31, 2008. Therefore, this case is without a presiding Judge 
who has any knowledge of the facts surrounding the case at hand and able to make 
any additional findings upon a reverse or remand. Therefore, it is appropriate that 
this court vacate the judgment and remand for a new evidentiary hearing. 
• The findings of facts, conclusion of law and final order, are ambiguous as to 
the facts relied upon and the conclusions are confusing, contradictory and in 
conflict with one another. 
• The damages awarded the Plaintiff are not based on facts and are not 
founded upon the evidence, or supported by law. 
• The damages NOT awarded the Plaintiff are not based on facts and are not 
founded upon the evidence, or supported by law. 
• The Trial Court's limiting the amount owed by the Defendant to the 
Plaintiff, because the Defendant did not authorize the projects personally, 
was an abuse of discretion. The Defendant appointed her husband as the 
Defendant's Agent, work requested or approved by the Defendant's Agent is 
the obligation of the Defendant, therefore the Plaintiff is entitled to the full 
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compensation due to him. 
• The meeting of the minds is clear and evident based upon the continuous 
behavior of the parties throughout the 5 lA months long project. 
• The Trial Court acceptance of the Defendant's unsupported alleged cash 
payments and the checks that are not in evidence is an abuse of discretion by 
the Trial Court. It is a well-established fact that payment is a defense, but 
the obligee bears the burden of proving that, he or she fulfilled his or her 
obligation. The Defendant did not prove that point. "It is well settled that 
payment is an affirmative defense, and that the party claiming payment has 
the burden of proving it." (quoting Marks v. Marks, 1940 UT, 100 P.2d 207) 
• The Plaintiff has prepared a spreadsheet that compares Defense Exhibit D14 
(shown below), with the facts in evidence. The Plaintiffs spreadsheet 
follows on the next page, and shows that the Defendant misrepresented 
evidence to the Trial Court upon which it relied. 
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PAYMENTS MADE TO MARK 
DATE DESCRIPTION P AYIY1 KNT M FTHOD AMOUNT 
2003-02-16 To get stared on clr:an-Np. 
2OO3-02-2S Balance of clean-up. 
2003-04-22 Advance for work to be completed. 
2003-05-02 Di aw Request froir. Mark. 
2003-05-12 Draw Request from Mark. 
2003-05-28 Draw Request from Mark. 
2003-06-04 Draw Request from Mark. 
2003-06-07 Draw Request from Mark. 
2003-06-07 Draw Request from Mark. 
2003-06-29 Draw RequesL from Mark. 
2003-07-05 Draw RecuesL from Mark. 
2003 07 12 Draw Request from Mark. 
2003-07-22 Draw Request from Mark. 
2003-0S-03 Draw Request from Mark. 
2003-0S-23 Draw Request from Mark. 
2003-09-02 Draw Request from Mark. 
Wells Fargo CU 1653 
Wells Fargo CM 1457 
Cash 
Zions BtokCUt 225 
Zions Bank Ck# 260 
Cash Transfer :o Mark's 
Zions Account 
Zions Bank C<# 351 
Golden West Ck# 13348 
Cfeck to JoshBergrr.an. 
Gave $200.00 lo Mark. 
Colder. West Ck# 1331/. 
Cash 
Cash 
Cash Transfer to Mark's 
Zions Account 
Zions Bank Ckif 506 
Cash 
Zions Bank Ck.#:>97 
$150.03 
sioo.or: 
$500.00 
$200.00 
$150.00 
$300.00 
S350.00 
S500.00 
S200.00 
S250.00 
S600.00 
$200.00 
$300.00 
$500.00 
S6U0.00 
$320.00 
$5,220.00 
State a CityD Plaintiff p Defendant tf 
Exhibit. /)/</ 
Name -DCrWrviA- V- FffSi/fiWr^ 
Cass # VyogOQWy 
Date Received / M 3 ~ u i 
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Using Defense Exhibit D13 (copies of checks), and comparing such to Defense 
Exhibit D14 (summary of payments), a person finds a difference of $3,900 less 
than claimed and deducted from the Plaintiffs award. SEE: spreadsheet below: 
Defense Exhibit D13 provides the evidence for only four (4) payments 
The Plaintiff has removed all cash payments as such are unproven 
DATE 
12-May-03 
4-Jun-03 
29-Aug-03 
2-Sep-03 
DESCRIPTION 
PAYMENT 
PAYMENT 
PAYMENT 
PAYMENT 
TOTAL OF ALLEGDED PAYMENTS PAID TO MARK AS PER DEFEI 
PAYMENT 
METHOD 
ZIONS BANK CK# 
260 
ZIONS BANK CK# 
351 
ZIONS BANK CK# 
506 
ZIONS BANK CK# 
597 
TOTAL OF 
PAYMENTS 
MSE EXHIBIT D14 
AMOUNT TOTAL 
DIFFERANCE 
AMOUNT 
$150 
$350 
$500 
$320 
$1,320 
$5,220.00 
$3,900.00 
THUS, FOR THIS APPELLATE COURT TO VACATE THE 
JUDGMENT AND REMAND IS APPROPRIATE 
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Summary of Argument 
The Plaintiffs argument is founded upon Utah mechanic's lien statutes, 
quantum meruit, a contract implied-in-fact, value added to the Defendant's real 
property, the behavior of the parties, the Defendant's Agent supervised the work, 
the length of the project, and the Defendant's defenses are all unsupported by 
evidence. 
It is well established that the Plaintiff started a project for the Defendant on or 
about May 10, 2003, and finished on or about October 4, 2003. It is therefore 
completely irrelevant that the Defendant is claiming (now that the work is 
complete) that the total amount of work is valued at $7,500. However, should we 
assume this is true, a simple mathematical evaluation shows such does not reach 
the Utah's Minimum Wage Act. Thus, such would look like the following: 
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Total Plaintiff claimed spent on materials $4,675.00 
Total of materials claimed as not approved by Defendant SEE D15 -$1,791.84 
=$2,883.16 
Total (awarded Plaintiff) value of work as claimed by the Defendant $7,500.00 
-$2,883.16 
=$4,616.84 
Reflects the true total amount of payments as proven by D13 -$1,320.00 
=$3,296.84 
Total number of hours claimed by Plaintiff /l,200hrs 
Plaintiffs Hourly wage for the project =$2.74 
A contract is valid and enforceable when two competent parties offer something 
of consideration to each other. In this case, the Plaintiff provided labor and 
materials, which increased the value of the Defendant's home and property. In 
turn, the Plaintiff expected payment for the services provided. The parties are 
competent, and therefore can enter into a binding agreement. 
The Defendant should have known or knew that the services the Plaintiff was 
providing would cost the Defendant and the Plaintiff had every right to expect 
payment for the services he provided. 
The Defendant claims that she asked the Plaintiff to stop work several times but 
the Plaintiff refused (SEE: exhibit D17 and Defendant's Closing arguments (page 
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15, last sentence)). Yet, neither the Defendant nor the Defendant's Agent offered 
anything to prove this fact. However, their actions and behavior proved just the 
opposite. 
IfThe Defendant answered the Plaintiffs Complaint, stating that the Plaintiffs 
mechanic's lien was a wrongful lien, yet the Defendant never presented any 
evidence to that end. 
The Defendant affirmed the debt and contract, when on or about August 3, 
2003, after receiving a detailed billing statement from the Plaintiff for $13,000, the 
Defendant issued a check to the Plaintiff in the amount of $500.00 with a promise 
10r more very soon, with hopes to keep the Plaintiff working on the Defendant's 
project (SEE: D14). 
The Defendant claims that the payments that the Defendant made to the 
Plaintiff were small because the Defendant could not afford any more as they had 
three house payments to make each month. 
It is undisputed that the Defendant's property was a disaster when the Plaintiff 
started the project and that the Plaintiff did a great job (SEE: D17). 
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Detail of the Argument 
The Trial Court's findings of fact state that the Defendant and or the 
Defendant's Agent visited the project at least once a week during the entire project. 
Accordingly, by her own admission, the Defendant had ample time to observe the 
Plaintiff at work on the property, to ask questions of the Plaintiff concerning the 
Plaintiffs expenses and work hours, yet there is nothing in evidence to show that 
the Defendant ever inquired or was concerned with such expenses or hours. 
The Defendant submitted no evidence documenting that the Defendant ever 
asked the Plaintiff to stop working on the property at issue. Thus, any argument 
concerning such is moot. The Defendant's Agent is a licensed Utah Contractor, 
therefore it is safe to say that he is viewed as a professional by the public and the 
industry. 
Established as a professional, the Defendant's Agent is well aware of how to 
stop someone from working on a project that as claimed by the Defendant and the 
Defendant's Agent both asked the Plaintiff to stop working. First, you can fire the 
worker, you can call the police and report trespassing, and you can call the Utah 
State Contractors licensing Department amongst other things. Only, the Defendant 
claims that the Plaintiff would not stop working, and that the Plaintiff would even 
call and tell the Defendant that they now owe more money because of work 
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recentlv completed. 
Because the Trial Court's finding are so vague and do not explain what 
evidence it relied upon to make its findings, one cannot know for sure if the Trial 
Court gave this claim of the Defendant any weight. However, if the Trial Court 
did, it allowed it's self to be lead away from the merits of the case. As the 
Defendant did not produce a single piece of evidence that proved any part of this 
claim. 
Through out the project due to the supervision and oversight, the Plaintiff 
understood that the work he provided was requested and approved, and since there 
isino evidence to the contrary, all work the Plaintiff performed was authorized and 
approved by the. Defendant and or by the Defendant's Agent. If the Defendant's 
Agent failed to inform the Defendant of what he had authorized the Plaintiff to do, 
this cannot reflect upon what the Plaintiff is due by the Defendant. 
Based on the tact that the parties had known each other for several years (SEE: 
bl7), and the fact that the Defendant's Agent hired the Plaintiff for several other 
jobs in the past, the Defendant has no foundation to now claim that she did not 
agree to the Plaintiffs standard wage of $20.00 per hour. The fact the Defendant 
or the Defendant's Agent never requested an hourly break down before or during 
the project, the Plaintiff cannot be expected to provide one now. It is rather 
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disingenuous of the Defendant to try to change the terms now they do not suit her. 
The Defendant has stated in the pleadings and affidavits that the parties agreed 
to hire the Plaintiff to work on the real property. Therefore, the Plaintiff is entitled 
to receive financially compensated for the work. 
The only argument the Defendant could have against owing the full amount to 
the Plaintiff is if the Defendant intended to defraud the Plaintiff by requesting the 
Plaintiff to perform services for which the Defendant never intended to compensate 
the Plaintiff for performing. As the Court is aware, intent to commit fraud is not a 
valid argument. That is why a mechanic's lien law exists - to enforce payment 
when parties renege on their commitment to do so. 
The Defendant paid the Plaintiff $500 on August 3, 2003 (SEE: D14), after 
receiving a detailed bill for $13,000 from the Plaintiff on that same day. SEE: 
(Defendant's closing arguments (page 7, "response")). With this payment, the 
Defendant has affirmed the debt for a minimum of $13,000, and then reaffirmed 
the debt again with the payment made on September 2, 2003, for $320 (SEE D14). 
Thereby, the Defendant has affirmed the debt and that a contract existed between 
the parties. 
It has not been disputed that the market value of the home and real property 
when the Plaintiff began the repairs and renovation was between $60,000 and 
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$70,000. When the Plaintiff completed the repairs and renovation on the property, 
it was listed with the Defendant's Listing Agent for as much as $115,900. 
Therefore, there was, at a minimum, an increase in value of $45,900 to $55,900 
from the Plaintiff ,s work based on the final listing price. The Defendant became 
significantly unjustly enriched due to the Plaintiffs efforts. SEE: (Plaintiffs 
Closing arguments (page 6 f3)). 
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Conclusion and Statement of Relief Sought 
For the foregoing reasons, the Trial Court's findings are found as contradictory 
and unclear as to their true meaning, and that such are insufficient to reach the 
Trial Court's conclusions. In addition, based upon the actions, behavior of the 
parties, the Defendant's Agents oversight is the second cause of the Defendant's 
liability due the Plaintiff, there was an enforceable agreement established, and the 
Trial Court needs to find the true value of the services provided. Thus, a judgment 
can be rendered. 
Therefore, the Trial Court's conclusions of law, as framed, should be found as 
legally insufficient, a clear error, and such do not allow for a meaningful review 
and cannot be relied upon. Thereby, it is appropriate for such to be vacated and the 
case remanded for a new evidential hearing. 
Furthermore, the alternative security released by the Trial Court to the 
Defendant be placed into the Trial Court's escrow, securing the Plaintiffs 
mechanic's lien at issue, with the exception of the $2,280.00 that was released to 
the Plaintiff. 
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fliat should the Plaintiff prevail in this appeal, the Defendant is ordered to pay 
the (plaintiffs legal cost and expenses which the Plaintiff incurred, together with 
interest on any amount found to be due the Plaintiff by the Defendant. 
Respectively submitted, 
Dated November _ V , 2008 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I CERTIFY THAT ON THE Q DAY OF November, 2008 THE 
FOREGOING -Cft5-t,-pC-ViS WAS SERVED ON THE DEFENDANT/ 
Appellee BY MAILING A TRUE AND CORRECT COPY VIA FIRST-CLASS 
U.S. MAIL, POSTAGE PREPAID TO THE FOLLOWING ADDRESS; 
Respectfully, 
Atty. For the Defendant/ Appellee 
Michael E. Bostwick 
6776 South 1300 East 
Salt Lake City, UT. 84121 
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